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Constitutional Law. Giroux v. Purington Building Systems, Inc.,
670 A.2d 1227 (R.I. 1996). Rhode Island General Laws section 27-
7-2.4, which entitles a complaint to be filed directly against the lia-
bility insurer of an alleged tort-feasor who has filed for bankruptcy,
is not preempted by federal bankruptcy law, and is not unconstitu-
tional where substitution does not harm other creditors.
By virtue of the bankruptcy clause of the United States Con-
stitution, Congress is empowered to enact a national bankruptcy
law.' In International Shoe v. Pinkus,2 the United States Supreme
Court held that federal bankruptcy law preempts any state law
that interferes with the bankruptcy laws or creates additional reg-
ulations.3 In Giroux v. Purington Building Systems, Inc.,4 the
Rhode Island Supreme Court was confronted with a constitutional
challenge to Rhode Island General Laws section 27-7-2.4.5 Con-
cluding that section 27-7-2.4 is not preempted by federal law, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the goals of the federal
bankruptcy laws are not frustrated by the substitution of the in-
surer when there is but one claimant against the policy.6
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Richard Giroux was employed by Gustafson Steel Erectors,
Inc., a subcontractor for Purington Building Systems, Inc.7 Giroux
alleged that he sustained severe injuries while working in this ca-
pacity, when he was struck by a prefabricated roof decking that
caused him to fall from a structure he was building.8 The building
and its components, including the roof decking, were manufac-
tured by Inland Buildings, Inc.9
Giroux filed a complaint on September 13, 1990, against both
Purington and Inland, in which he alleged that Purington was neg-
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The bankruptcy clause states that "Congress
shall have [the] [plower . . [tlo establish . . . uniform [liaws on the subject of
[blankruptcies throughout the United States."
2. 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
3. Giroux v. Purington Bldg. Sys., Inc., 670 A.2d 1227, 1230 (R.I. 1996) (cit-
ing International Shoe, 278 U.S. 261).
4. 670 A.2d 1227 (ILI. 1996).
5. Id. at 1229.
6. Giroux, 670 A.2d at 1231.
7. Id. at 1228.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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ligent in failing to maintain a safe job site and that Inland was
negligent in designing, manufacturing and selling the building.10
On December 11, 1990, Purington filed a third party complaint
against Gustafson.1" Purington alleged that Gustafson had previ-
ously agreed to indemnify Purington for all claims arising from,
and incident to, Gustafson's job site performance.' 2 In addition, in
April 1992, Purington filed a cross-claim against Inland.' 3
On September 10, 1992, Inland applied for and received pro-
tection under Chapter Eleven of the United States Bankruptcy
Code.14 Inland conceded that it had a liability insurance policy
through Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., Inc. 15 In August 1993,
Giroux filed a motion pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws sec-
tion 27-7-2.416 to substitute the insurance carrier, Aetna, for In-
land, as defendant.' 7 In response, the superior court granted
Giroux's motion and rejected Inland's contention that relief from
the automatic stay"" was a condition precedent to the superior
courtes having jurisdiction to substitute Aetna as defendant. 19
10. Id.
11. Id. The court dismissed Giroux's complaint against Purington as a result
of a dismissal stipulation entered into by Giroux and Purington on December 21,




14. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-46).
15. Id
16. PlI. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.4 (1995) states that:
[amny person, having a claim because of damages of any kind caused by
the tort of any other person, may file a complaint directly against the lia-
bility insurer of the alleged tort-feasor seeking compensation by way of a
judgment for money damages whenever the alleged tort-feasor files for
bankruptcy, involving a reorganization for the benefit of creditors or a
wage earner plan, provided that the complaining party shall not recover
an amount in excess of the insurance coverage available for the tort com-
plained of.
Id.
17. Girou 670 A.2d at 1228.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) states that:
a [bankruptcy] petition filed ... operates as a stay ... of the commence-
ment or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of
a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the
case under [Title 113, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under [Title 11].
Id.
19. Giroux, 670 A.2d at 1228.
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Seeking a review of the superior court's substitution order, Aetna
and Inland filed, and were granted, a writ of certiorari on June 30,
1994.20 On July 26, 1994, Giroux filed a motion in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, to
modify the automatic stay to allow Giroux to pursue his suit
against Aetna.21 In response, the bankruptcy court ordered a mod-
ification of the stay so the Rhode Island courts could determine
against whom the action should proceed. 22
In their petition for certiorari, Inland and Aetna claimed that
substitution was unnecessary because Giroux was allowed to pro-
ceed in his claim directly against Inland as a result of the bank-
ruptcy court's order granting relief from the automatic stay.23
Aetna and Inland also argued that substitution was permissive
and discretionary under section 27-7-2.4, and that the superior
court erred by not using its discretion to protect Aetna from the
prejudice created by being substituted as defendant.2 Lastly, In-
land and Aetna argued that section 27-7-2.4 was unconstitutional
and preempted by federal law in that it impeded the bankruptcy
court's ability to protect the assets of the debtor.25 Conversely, Gi-
roux contended that section 27-7-2.4 did not require a determina-
tion that substitution was necessary or reasonable given the clear
and unambiguous language of the statute.26
BACKGROUND
Empowered by the language of the United States Constitu-
tion,27 Congress enacted a national bankruptcy law that preempts
any state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.2s Any state law
that interferes with the bankruptcy laws or creates additional reg-
20. Id.
21. Id. Inland applied for and received protection under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1228-29.
25. Id. at 1229.
26. Id-
27. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
28. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause states that the "Constitu-
tion, and the [1]aws ... made in [p]ursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme [1]aw
of the land." See Texaco, Inc. v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 464 F.2d 389, 392
(10th Cir. 1972).
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ulations has been held to be preempted by federal bankruptcy
law. 2 9 In Rhode Island, it has been firmly established that the fed-
eral bankruptcy laws preempt the state laws of insolvency and the
rights of debtors.3 0
Prior to Giroux, Rhode Island courts had never addressed
whether a liability policy of insurance is an asset of the debtor
within the control of the bankruptcy court.3 ' However, the issue
has been addressed in other jurisdictions.3 2 In Tringali v.
Hathaway Machinery Co.,33 the plaintiff was injured working on a
fishing boat while using a winch.34 Tringali brought suit against
the manufacturer of the winch, and was awarded one million dol-
lars in damages.35 As a result, the manufacturer filed for Chapter
Eleven protection under the Bankruptcy Code.36 In response,
Tringali requested that the "automatic stay" be lifted to allow him
to pursue a state court proceeding to recover the proceeds from the
manufacturer's liability policy. 37 The district court granted Trin-
gali's request and the manufacturer appealed.38
In reversing the lifting of the "automatic stay," the First Cir-
cuit rejected Tringali's argument that they were not subject to the
automatic stay since the proceeds of the liability insurance policy
were not property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 39 The
court held that the language of section 541(a)(1) was sufficiently
broad to encompass an interest in a liability policy. 40 The court
expressed concern that a contrary holding could "start a race to the
29. Giroux, 670 A.2d at 1230 (citing International Shoe v. Pinkus, 278 U.S.
261 (1929)).
30. Id. (citing In re the Matter of Reynolds, 8 R.I. 485 (1867)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 796 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1986).





39. Id. at 560. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) states that "the commencement of a case
under [Title 11] ... creates an estate. Such an estate is comprised of... all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982 & Supp.1984).
40. Tringali, 796 F.2d at 560; see, e.g., A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d
994, 1001-02 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176, 184 (5th Cir. 1984); In re
Forty-Eight Insulators, Inc., 54 B.R. 905, 907-09 (Bankr. N.). IlM. 1985).
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courthouse whenever a policy is too small to satisfy several poten-
tial plaintiffs."4 1
ANALYsIs AwD HOLDING
Prior to addressing whether substitution was permissive and
judicially discretionary, the court analyzed the language of Rhode
Island General Laws section 27-7-2.4 and held that the language
was clear and unambiguous.42 As such, the court stated that an
injured party is entitled to substitute the tort-feasor's liability in-
surer as defendant upon the filing of bankruptcy by the tort-fea-
sor. 43 In addition, the court found that section 27-7-2.4 does not
expressly call for any other condition to be satisfied for the substi-
tution of the insurer as defendant.44 Accordingly, the court re-
jected Aetna's and Inland's assertions that conditions such as
judicial discretion, and obtaining a modification of an automatic
stay were necessary conditions for substitution.45 In view of the
aforementioned, the court concluded that the mere filing of bank-
ruptcy by Inland, and nothing more, entitled Giroux to substitute
Aetna for Inland under section 27-7-2.4.46
In spite of the urging of Aetna and Inland, the court rejected
the assertion that substitution of Aetna was unnecessary since Gi-
roux could pursue his claim against Inland.47 The bankruptcy
court's order simply allowed the State to interpret and apply its
statutes, and to determine against whom the suit was to proceed.48
Otherwise stated, the Rhode Island Supreme Court interpreted the
order as indicative of the intent of the bankruptcy court, viz., to
modify the automatic stay so that a determination could be made
41. Tringali, 796 F.2d at 560.
42. Giroux v. Purington Bldg. Sys., Inc., 670 A.2d 1227, 1229 (R.I. 1996).
Although the meaning of Rhode Island General Laws section 27-7-2.4 had never
been addressed per se, a similar direct-action statute was previously analyzed in
Markham v. Allstate Insurance Co., 352 A.2d 651 (R.I. 1976). In Markham, the
court held that the expressed meaning of a statute will be presumed as the inten-
tion of the legislature where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous,
and expresses a plain and sensible meaning. Id-
43. Giroux, 670 A.2d at 1229.
44. I&
45. Id- at 1229-30.
46. Id
47. Id. at 1230.
48. Id-
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by the superior court as to Giroux's substitution motion.49 The
bankruptcy court's intent was not to re-expose Inland to the judg-
ment of the superior court.50 Consequently, Giroux's direct action
against Aetna was not foreclosed by the modification, since the au-
tomatic stay was operative and had not been modified with regard
to Inland.51
Lastly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected Aetna's and
Inland's assertion that section 27-7-2.4 was preempted by federal
law because it hindered the protection of the bankrupt's assets by
exposing the liability insurer to claims that preceded the bank-
ruptcy filing.5 2 This presented an issue of first impression for the
court: whether a policy of liability insurance is an asset of the
debtor for bankruptcy protection purposes 5 3
In deciding this issue, the court distinguished the instant ac-
tion from Tringali and A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin," both of which
had held that the debtor's liability policies were assets and entitled
to bankruptcy protection.55 Unlike the liability policy in the in-
stant action, the policies involved inAH. Robins and Tringali were
subject to claims of multiple parties.5 6 In the instant case, Giroux
was the only claimant against Inland's liability policy with Aetna
and there was no evidence to the contrary.57 The court reasoned
that Inland's other creditors could not be harmed in light of the
fact that they were not entitled to the insurance proceeds. 58
Therefore, the court concluded that by substituting the liability in-
surer as the defendant, where there is only one claimant of a liabil-
ity insurance policy, the harm alluded to in Tringali and AH.






54. 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986).
55. Giroux, 670 A.2d at 1231 (citing Tringali v. Hathaway Mach. Co., 796 F.2d




59. Id.; see, e.g., Aaron v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 475 So. 2d 379 (La. Ct-
App. 1985) (holding that a court may refuse an action in the event that the bank-
rupt's assets are threatened).
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CONCLUSION
Although an issue of first impression, the question of whether
a policy of liability insurance is an asset of a debtor was effortlessly
resolved by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, given the reliability
of the case law from other jurisdictions. As a consequence of Gi-
roux, Rhode Island now follows the majority of jurisdictions and
holds that a policy of liability insurance is an asset of the debtor
within the scope of the bankruptcy court. However, such assets
may be reached in cases such as Giroux where there is only one
claimant under the policy.
Michael J. Williams
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Constitutional Law. Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680
A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996). Anti-SLAPP statute found constitutional both
under United States and Rhode Island Constitutions and applica-
ble against allegations of tortious conduct.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees "the right of the people.., to petition the government for a
redress of grievances."1 The Strategic Litigation Against Public
Participation (anti-SLAPP)2 Act was enacted by the Rhode Island
General Assembly to protect individuals who exercise this First
Amendment right from lawsuits.3 In Hometown Properties v.
Fleming, Inc.,4 the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the
anti-SLAPP statute was constitutional, holding that persons exer-
cising their free speech rights fall within the protection of the stat-
ute for all claims including those of alleged tortious conduct.5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management
(DEM) held meetings with a group of North Kingstown, Rhode Is-
land residents regarding a local landfill.6 Following these meet-
ings, the defendant, Nancy Hsu Fleming (Fleming), wrote a letter
to the DEM alleging that a landfill operated by the plaintiff,
Hometown Properties, Inc. (Hometown), should be closed and cle-
aned of hazardous waste and contaminated groundwater.7
Hometown filed a complaint in the Rhode Island Superior Court
1. U.S. Const. amend. I.
2. See George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, SLAPPs: An Overview of the
Practice, C935 ALI-ABA 1 (1994). Professors Pring and Canan developed the term
"SLAPP" to describe the occurrence of a suit initiated to punish activists for peti-
tioning the government.
3. Rhode Island General Laws section 9-33-1 states that "[flull participation
by persons and organizations and robust discussion of issues of public concern...
are essential to the democratic process." LI. Gen. Laws § 9-33-1 (1995).
4. 680 A.2d 56 (LI. 1996).
5. Id. at 64.
6. Id. at 58. The meetings were held around November 21, 1991, and Febru-
ary 17, 1992. Id.
7. Id. The letter, which also commented on proposed new rules and regula-
tions for groundwater quality proposed by the DEM, stated that "It]here are clear
statements by the EPA and other experts that the Landfill contains hazardous
waste, that the Landfill continues to contaminate offsite groundwater .... The
Town expert has documented a three-year history of groundwater contamination."
Id. The letter was copied to various state and federal officials. Id.
1997]
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after Fleming refused to issue a retraction.8 The complaint sought
compensatory and punitive damages for defamation and tortious
interference.9 Fleming filed a motion to dismiss in the superior
court claiming an "absolute constitutional privilege against tort li-
ability" from her statements made in the letter to DEM.10 The mo-
tion was denied."-
Fleming filed a second motion to dismiss based on the Rhode
Island anti-SLAPP statute. 12 The motion was passed on by the
motion judge, and Fleming subsequently filed a third motion to dis-
miss which was accompanied by a memorandum in support of her
position.' 3 The superior court denied Fleming's motion, stating
that the defendant did not fall within the class of defendants de-
fined in the statute, and held that the statute does not provide ab-
solute immunity for libel. 14 Fleming appealed contending that the
"Noerr-Pennington doctrine" should be applied in interpreting the
anti-SLAPP statute.' 5 Hometown argued that the anti-SLAPP act
was unconstitutional. 16
BACKGROUND
The General Assembly enacted the anti-SLAPP statute to pro-
tect valid governmental petitioning as a response to "a disturbing
increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise
.of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of griev-
8. Id. at 59. The complaint was filed December 2, 1992. Id
9. Id.
10. Id. The Rhode Island Attorney General filed an amicus curiae brief on
behalf of Fleming. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The Rhode Island General Assembly enacted the anti-SLAPP statute.
R.I. Gen- Laws § 9-33-1 (1993). All actions that had "not been fully adjudicated" by
the date of the act were included retroactively, and a party to such action was
allowed to file a "special motion to dismiss a claim" within 60 days of enactment
Id.
13. Hometown, 682 A.2d at 59. The memorandum included reports and gov-
ernent documents that supported Fleming's contention that her disputed state-
ments were made in response to public comments that were sought by the DEM
regarding proposed landfill rules. Id-
14. Id. The motion judge presumed the anti-SLAPP statute was constitu-
tional. Id.
15. Id. See infra note 18 for an explanation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
16. Id. at 60. Hometown challenged the statute on "equal protection, right to
a trial by jury, due process, retroactive application, separation of powers, denial of
access to state courts, and bill of attainder" issues. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
ances."'17 The First Amendment right to petition was clearly ar-
ticulated by the United States Supreme Court through its
formulation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.'i The Rhode Island
Supreme Court articulated the doctrine to mean that if the defend-
ant looked to the outcome of the government process to resolve the
dispute, then the petitioning was legitimate. 19 The supreme court
adopted the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,20 and concluded that con-
stitutional considerations take precedence over common law tort
doctrines. 21
The original enactment of the Rhode Island anti-SLAPP stat-
ute in 1993 provided that the moving party should be granted a
"special motion to dismiss" if the claim involved free speech and
the "moving party did not engage in a course of tortious conduct."22
This provision was amended in its entirety in 1995, articulating
the "conditional immunity afforded to non-sham petitioning activ-
ity under Noerr-Pennington."2 3 The amendment defined a "sham
activity" as one that is both objectively baseless in that "no reason-
able person... could realistically expect success in procuring such
government action," and "subjectively baseless in the sense that it
is actually an attempt to use the governmental process for its own
direct effect."24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found the anti-SLAPP stat-
ute constitutional based upon the principle that the court may
adopt an interpretation of the language that avoids a finding of
17. Id. at 61 (quoting PI. Gen. Laws § 9-33-1 (1993)).
18. Id at 60; see Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United States Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965). These cases, originally brought in the context of antitrust law, held that,
when the alleged anti-competitive activity involved a legitimate, i.e., not a "sham,"
petition of the government, the activity would not violate antitrust laws.
19. Hometown, 680 A.2d at 60.
20. Id. at 60-61; see Cove Road Dev. v. West Cranston Indus. Park Assoc., 674
A.2d 1234, 1236 (RI. 1996); Pound Hill Corp., Inc. v. Perl, 668 A.2d 1260, 1263
(LI. 1996).
21. Hometown, 680 A.2d at 60 (citing Cove Road, 674 A.2d at 1239).
22. Id. at 61 (quoting II. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a) (1995)).
23. Id. (citing RI. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a)). The amended provision grants con-
ditional immunity from civil claims, counterclaims and cross-claims that are di-
rected at free speech. Id.
24. &I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a)(1)-(2) (1995).
1997] 427
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unconstitutionality. 25 The statute was held to be consistent with
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which is based upon the First
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of griev-
ances.26 The anti-SLAPP statute was also construed as being con-
sistent with the General Assembly's intent to "secure the vital role
of open discourse on matters of public importance."27
Hometown claimed that an action for defamation would fall
outside the immunity of the statute.28 The original anti-SLAPP
act enacted in 1993 did not contain the Noerr-Pennington sham
doctrine, and the 1995 amendment 29 to the anti-SLAPP statute
was not applied retroactively.3 0 The superior court judge agreed
with Hometown that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was not appli-
cable, and could not "rule as a matter of law that [Fleming] did not
engage in tortious conduct."3' The court found that Fleming did
not fall "within the class of defendants defined in 9-33-2(a)." 32 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in re-
garding the Noerr-Pennington doctrine inapplicable to the anti-
SLAPP statute.33
The supreme court held that the 1995 amendment was in-
tended only to clarify the original provisions, and it specifically
found that the "term 'tortious conduct' in the 1993 act is synony-
mous with the term 'sham petitioning' in the 1995 amendment."3 4
An allegation that a party has engaged in tortious conduct was
never intended by the legislature as an exception to the anti-
SLAPP statute.35 The court concluded by stating " t]he anti-
SLAPP statute and our holding today are consistent with the inde-
pendence and individualism that led this state's earliest settlers 'to
25. Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO), 593 A.2d 943, 946 (RI. 1991)
(holding that the court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the act
is contrary to a constitutional provision, and if more than one interpretation is
available, then the court will avoid unconstitutionality).
26. Hometown, 680 A.2d at 60-62.
27. Id. at 62.
28. Id.
29. Id. The 1995 amendment to the anti-SLAPP statute applied to a provision
that was nearly identical to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See supra note 18.
30. Hometown, 682 A.2d at 62.
31. Id. at 63.
32. Id. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text for the requirements of
the statute.
33. Hometown, 682 A.2d at 63.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 64.
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create a free community of seekers after the Truth and a haven for
those persecuted elsewhere for their conscientious beliefs."3 6
CONCLUSION
The court's holding in Hometown allows activists broad immu-
nity from civil suit as long as the activity is related to involvement
with public forums.37 The intent of the statute is to protect the
valid exercise of free speech. 38 This immunity may be too broad,
especially where the equitable rights of legitimate plaintiffs are
not protected from grossly tortious conduct of activists or
extremists.
In order to find a balance between the rights of legitimate
plaintiffs and public participants, the application of the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine should be modified to give equal weight to both
the objective and the subjective test in defining what constitutes a
"sham." This doctrine, which has been applied to the Rhode Island
anti-SLAPP statute, deems that free speech is a sham only if both
the objective and subjective tests are met. It does not consider the
weight of each test. A highly abusive activist can be granted im-
munity under the test as long as there is any objective basis of
legitimacy in the exercise of his or her rights.
There is a dramatic need to encourage citizen involvement in
any representative democracy. The anti-SLAPP statute helps to
preserve this objective by protecting participation without the chill
of an abusive lawsuit. The courts and the legislature should con-
sider balancing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to protect legiti-
mate plaintiffs adequately from potential abuses of this immunity.
Lesley S. Rich
36. Id. (quoting William G. McLoughlin, Rhode Island, A History 10 (1978)).
37. Id.
38. Id. The United States Supreme Court has established limits on some
types of speech such as obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and
fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The anti-
SLAPP statute and the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in Hometown does
not establish any such limitations on acceptable speech that may be protected by
the immunity of the statute.
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